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“Herd ‘em up, pack ‘em off and give ‘em the inside room in the badlands. Let ‘em be pinched, hurt, 
hungry and dead up against it...let us have no patience with the enemy or with anyone whose veins carry 
his blood...personally, I hate the Japanese. And that goes for all of them.”1  




Fundamental to the American experiment since its inception is the question of how a 
nation of immigrants can confront race and difference in ensuring the ability of its citizens to 
pursue a dignified life within it. Racism and discrimination have never been confined to 
presidents or to the public. The legal system has produced some of the most concerning racial 
injustices throughout the history of the United States.2 The supposed objectivity behind which 
these injustices are masked renders them all the more insidious.   
Japanese Americans represent some of the most notable victims of legal racism in the 
form of their internment during the Second World War. The memory and legacy of this event has 
served as a motivation for “Japanese Americans to forge sympathetic connections with...new 
immigrant groups who are at risk of suffering the same racist mistreatment.”3 In an amicus brief 
 
1 Henry McLemore, “This Is War! Stop Worrying About Hurting Jap Feelings,” Seattle Times, January 30, 1942, 
accessed November 9, 2019, http://densho.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Documents_SPW.pdf.  
2 This kind of injustice is evident in the legal fiction of the enslaved as both people and property and the resultant 
three-fifths clause. Indeed, Malick W. Ghachem described how this clause issued from the absurd view of “‘the 
mixt’ character of persons who were also property, things that were also persons.” “The Slave’s Two Bodies: The 
Life of an American Legal Fiction,” William and Mary Quarterly 60, no. 4 (Oct. 2003): 810.  
3 Jane Naomi Iwamura, “Critical Faith: Japanese Americans and the Birth of a New Civil Religion,” American 
Quarterly 59, no. 3 (Sep. 2007): 943.  
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submitted to the Supreme Court in opposition to the President Trump’s “Muslim ban,” the 
Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) reiterated sentiment from their amicus brief in 
Hirabayashi v. United States writing that they “look[ed] to this Court, as the guardians of the 
liberties of all the people of the United States...to protect them from such discrimination as 
this...not for their sake alone, but also for the sake of every minority racial group in American 
life.”4 The JACL argued that the president’s policy appealed to public fear of the “other” to 
justify extreme measures to ensure national security which was similarly apparent in the years 
leading up to internment. There are distinct dangers in this scramble for security with regard to 
the law and those subject to it. The JACL wrote later in their brief that, “the Government insists 
that this Court must accept its talismanic incantation of ‘national security’ and shirk its core 
responsibility to take a hard look at arbitrary, discriminatory, and harmful treatment of a 
disfavored group.”5 Justice Sonia Sotomayor went so far as to write in  her dissent of Trump v. 
Hawaii that in sanctioning a discriminatory travel ban “in the name of a superficial claim of 
national security, the Court redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and 
merely replaces one ‘gravely wrong’ decision with another.”6 This sense of déja-vu was made all 
the more tangible in the Government’s recently announced plans to detain immigrants at Fort 
Sill, Oklahoma, a base once used as an internment camp for Japanese Americans.7 The 
imprisonment of over a hundred thousand Issei (“first-generation”) and Nisei (“second-
generation”) Japanese immigrants on the basis of their ancestry lives on in American 
consciousness not only as the “defining moment...that both informs and haunts Japanese-
American identity...to this day,” but also as a revelation regarding the nature of rights and 
resistance in times of crisis.8 The Supreme Court and surrounding legal discourse placed 
Japanese-American internment outside of legal jurisdiction. Those within the camps were thus 
condemned to a life lacking political qualification and juridical personhood. Faced with the 
dangers of this condition, interned Japanese Americans who served in the U.S. military 
consciously laid claim to the American political community through the sacrifice of their lives. 




4 Brief for the Japanese American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at Donald J. Trump, 
President of the United States v. International Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16-1436 (U.S. June 2, 2017) and at 
Donald J. Trump, President of the United States v. State of Hawaii, No. 16-1540 (U.S. June 26, 2017) [hereinafter 
Brief for the United States], 2.  
5 Brief for the Japanese American Citizens League as Amicus Curiae, 2.  
6 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. ___ (2018).  
7 Ben Fenwick, “‘Stop Repeating History’: Plan to Keep Migrant Children at Former Internment Camp Draws 
Outrage,” The New York Times, June 22, 2019, accessed November 7, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/us/fort-sill-protests-japanese-internment.html; Fort Sill is also infamous for 
the detention of Native Americans, most notably Geronimo, during the “Indian Wars” of the late 19 th Century.  
8 Iwamura, “Critical Faith,” 939.  
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A Failure to Protect  
Scholarly consensus in the wake of World War II has recognized the unconstitutionality 
of Executive Order 9066, which authorized the internment of Japanese Americans. Indeed, most 
scholars concur that “Korematsu is a tainted precedent, more reviled than respected.”9 The 
current Supreme Court has affirmed this sentiment. In the recent and highly contentious case of 
Trump v. Hawaii, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “the forcible relocation of U. S. citizens to 
concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and 
outside the scope of Presidential authority.”10 The defining work on this issue, the 1983 report of 
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, offers some insight into the 
court’s desire to condemn this ruling. The report concluded that military necessity did not justify 
the exclusion and detention of Japanese Americans.11 Instead, the “causes that shaped these 
decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”12 The 1942 
report of Lt. General DeWitt, who both recommended and oversaw the removal of Japanese 
Americans from the West Coast, confirms the discriminatory premise of this order. He wrote 
simply: “the Japanese race is an enemy race.”13 In his 1943 testimony before the House Naval 
Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas, he elaborated that “we must worry about 
the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.”14 In his dissent in Korematsu v. United 
States, Justice Frank Murphy cited General DeWitt’s blatant racism to indicate that internment 
was the result of an “erroneous assumption of racial guilt rather than bona fide military 
necessity.”15 Justice Murphy went on to argue that DeWitt had cast suspicion over an entire 
racial group and undermined the principle of individual culpability, a key tenet of American 
jurisprudence. Korematsu, then, represented nothing less than the “legalization of racism.”16 This 
landmark case set precedent which would not be overturned until 2018.17  
Having established that Korematsu is nearly universally held to represent an affront to 
American jurisprudence, it is clear that the Supreme Court failed in its responsibility to protect 
the constitutional rights of Japanese Americans. This comes as no surprise to David Cole who 
 
9 Richard H. Fallon Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, “Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on 
Terror,” Harvard Law Review 120, no. 8 (June 2007): 2077.  
10 Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ____ (2018). 
11 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied: Report of the 
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (Washington D.C.: Civil Liberties Public Education 
Fund, 1997), 459.  
12 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied, 459.  
13 United States Department of War, United States Fourth Army, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West 
Coast 1942 by John Lesesne DeWitt. U.S. Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, San Francisco, 1943.   
14 Cong. Rec. S1, 739-40 (April 13, 1943) (voluntary testimony of Lt. General DeWitt before the House Naval 
Affairs Subcommittee to Investigate Congested Areas) 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d03671272h&view=1up&seq=5.  
15 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944).  
16 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944).  
17 Charlie Savage, “Korematsu, Notorious Supreme Court Ruling on Japanese Internment, Is Finally Tossed Out,” 
The New York Times, June 26, 2018, accessed November 16, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/korematsu-supreme-court-ruling.html.   
31 
 
holds as conventional wisdom that “courts are ineffective as guardians of liberty when the 
general public is clamoring for security.”18 Re-examining the nature of legal decisions in times of 
emergency demonstrates, however, that this scholarly consensus falls short in its explanatory 
capacity and reveals the extra-legality of Japanese-American internment. Cole cites numerous 
causes of the court’s inadequacy. Two of these, which are painfully clear in the case of Japanese-
American internment, not only indicate that Cole is correct in his thesis but substantiate an even 
larger claim: internment represented an event beyond the pale of legal-jurisdiction altogether. 
Cole writes that courts fare poorly in times of war as they cannot stand above the crisis because 
of their inability to access complete information.19 This informational deficit is evident in the 
suppression of evidence in Korematsu. In a 1941 report from the Office of Naval Intelligence, 
the Ringle Report for short, Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Ringle concluded that “the entire 
‘Japanese Problem’ has been magnified out of its true proportion, largely because of the physical 
characteristics of the people.”20 He further emphasized the problematic racial nature of this issue 
by indicating that suspicion should not be held to a greater degree of those of Japanese descent 
than on Germans, Italians, and communists.21 As such, Ringle recommended that concerns about 
Japanese Americans should be handled case by case “and not on a racial basis.”22 The 
conclusions of this report seriously undermined the claim of military necessity advanced by the 
United States, especially considering the fact that descendants of other “enemy” groups were not 
similarly interned or suspected.23 The Solicitor General, however, withheld this report from the 
Supreme Court during its deliberations on two landmark cases regarding internment, 
Hirabayashi v. United States and Korematsu v. United States.24 In 2011, the office of the 
Solicitor General of the United States released a statement which confessed to the grave wrong 
done by their office with regard to the Ringle Report. The acting Solicitor General at the time, 
Neal Katyal, confirmed that “by the time the cases of Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu 
reached the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General had learned of a key intelligence report that 
undermined the rationale behind the internment.”25 The Solicitor General in question, Charles 
Fahy, justified his dishonesty with the court on largely racial grounds. Indeed, in defending his 
 
18 David Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis,” The 
Michigan Law Review Association 101, no. 8 (Aug. 2003): 2568. 
19 Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency,” 2570.  
20 United States Department of the Navy, Japanese Question, Report On by Kenneth D. Ringle. Lieutenant 
Commander United States Navy, Los Angeles, 1941.  
21 United States Department of the Navy, Japanese Question.  
22 United States Department of the Navy, Japanese Question.  
23 Though recent scholarship has recognized that some German and Italian Americans were also interned, the 
“omission of the…two groups in understandable because the wholesale relocation of Japanese-Americans – the 
majority, 70,000, being American-born – was the more egregious violation.” “When Italian Americans Were 
‘Enemy Aliens,’” Rose D. Scherinni, in Una Storia Segreta: The Secret History of Italian American Evacuation and 
Interment during World War II, ed. Lawrence DiStasi (Berkeley: Heyday Books, 2001), 27.  
24 Neal Katyal, “Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the JapaneseAmerican Internment 
Cases” [blog], United States Department of Justice, May 20, 2011, accessed November 7, 2019, 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generalsmistakes-during-japanese-american-
internment-cases.  
25 Katyal, “Confession of Error.”  
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suppression of evidence, Fahy referenced the disloyalty and racial solidarity of Japanese 
Americans.26 This suppression was not inconsequential as it was later employed to overturn 
Korematsu’s conviction in district court.27   
More concerning in understanding the failure of the Supreme Court in times of crisis, in 
that it is independent of the facts of the case itself, is the tendency of the court to rule in favor of 
the government amid concerns regarding legitimacy. Indeed, “courts must worry that if they rule 
against the government on a matter of national security, they may face a potential test of their 
credibility and legitimacy.”28 In other words, should the president disagree with their decision, 
they may refuse to enforce it and reveal the impotence of the court. Worcester v. Georgia is one 
ruling that illustrates this danger. In this case, the court ruled that the Cherokee nation was a 
dependent sovereign state protected from interference by citizens of Georgia.29 The court could 
do no more than watch, however, as President Andrew Jackson flaunted the ruling and allowed 
the removal of Cherokees to proceed.30 The snub of their legitimacy at the hands of the president 
was well summarized by President Jackson himself who reportedly remarked: “John Marshall 
made the decision; let him enforce it.”31 As he evaluated the Korematsu case, this concern was at 
the forefront of Justice Jackson’s consciousness. He worried that should the court rule against the 
government, “the War Relocation Authority might refuse to comply with the courts' orders.”32 
His dissenting opinion, then, represented a great risk as he admitted in a 1951 lecture. He 
confessed: “my view, if followed, would come close to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
or recognition of a state of martial law at the time and place found proper for military control.”33   
The question of legitimacy was not lost on President Roosevelt who discussed plans to 
defy a ruling against the order with Justice Jackson.34 According to Justice Jackson, Roosevelt 
had admitted “that outright defiance of the court was possible.”35 Roosevelt did not merely 
contemplate this possibility but had prepared to execute it in the past. During a 1935 case which 
challenged his executive order to abandon the gold standard, Roosevelt drafted a radio speech 
which reads:   
To stand idly by and to permit the decision of the Supreme Court to be carried through to 
its logical, inescapable conclusion would so imperil the economic and political security of 
 
26 Katyal, “Confession of Error.”  
27 Korematsu v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).  
28 Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency,” 2571.  
29 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832).  
30 Marion L. Starkey, The Cherokee Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 184.  
31 Starkey, The Cherokee Nation, 184.  
32 Dennis J. Hutchinson, “‘The Achilles Heel’ of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the Japanese Exclusion 
Cases,” The Supreme Court Review 2002, (2002): 489.  
33 Robert H. Jackson, “Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law” (2007 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, 
delivered at Buffalo Law School, Buffalo, NY, May 9, 1951).  
34 Hutchinson, “‘The Achilles Heel’ of the Constitution,” 489.  
35 Robert H. Jackson, interview by Harlan B. Phillips, 1952, VI, Columbia University Oral History Project, 
Columbia University, New York City, NY.  
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this nation that the legislative and executive officers of the Government look beyond the 
narrow letter of contractual obligations, so that they may sustain the substance.36  
The threat of Presidential defiance thus loomed over the court as it put together its majority 
opinion. The most vehement critic of Justice Jackson’s position was Justice Frankfurter who was 
careful to revise Justice Black’s first draft of the Korematsu decision in a way that ensured 
“judicial deference.”37 Cole and other scholars are thus correct in understanding that courts are 
ineffective when confronted with military emergency.   
These influences which led the court to produce such an abhorrent ruling in Korematsu, 
however, amounted to more than a failure in their stewardship of liberty. The shortcomings of 
the judicial branch culminated, in this case, in an expulsion from the American political 
community by means of rendering Japanese American internment extra-legal. An analysis of the 
opinions of the court, concurrences, and dissents in both Hirabayashi and Korematsu reveals the 
unique orientation of the internment camp.  Perhaps wishing to invoke Cicero’s famous 
statement, “when arms speak the laws are silent” (silent enim leges inter arma), Justice Frank 
Murphy wrote in his concurring opinion in the unanimously decided Hirabayashi that the mere 
existence of a state of war does not entail the suspension of constitutional rights.38 He went on, 
however, to write in concurrence that because of the “urgent necessity of taking prompt and 
effective action…against the risk of sabotage and espionage, the military authorities should not 
be required to conform to standards of regulatory action appropriate to normal times.”39 Finally, 
he briefly noted that “modern war does not always wait for the observance of procedural 
requirements.”40 Justice William Douglas similarly wrote that the judicial branch “cannot sit in 
judgment on the military requirements of that hour.”41 Here, Justice Douglas explicitly 
recognized that the court could or would not render judgment on such issues. In this refusal, 
Justice Douglas placed the exclusion orders made by the military beyond the reach of legal 
judgment.   
Turning to the case of Korematsu, Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred with the court 
writing that to describe “a military order that expresses an allowable judgment of war needs...as 
‘an unconstitutional order’ is to suffuse a part of the constitution with an atmosphere of 
unconstitutionality.”42 The logical conclusion of Justice Frankfurter’s reasoning is that the 
suspension of law is an element integral to the Constitution itself. In his dissent of the opinion 
rendered by the court in Korematsu, Justice Robert Jackson found the detention of Japanese 
Americans to be unconstitutional and racist, yet wrote in conclusion that he did “not suggest that 
 
36 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval, vol. 3 of The Age of Roosevelt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1960), 258. 
37 Peter Irons, Justice at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 332.  
38 Cicero, Pro Milone, trans. N.H. Watts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 17; Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).  
39 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).  
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944).  
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the courts should have attempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its task.”43 Thus, in 
both Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Justices of the Supreme Court either recognized the 
suspension of law as integral to times of war or that the Judicial branch could or would not 
interfere with the military even in the case of violations of constitutional rights. In both cases, the 
Supreme Court therefore affirmed that Japanese-American internment fell outside of the 
jurisdiction of the law altogether. So much for Justice Murphy’s reply to Cicero.  
The Supreme Court was not, however, solely responsible for this expulsion from legal 
jurisdiction. Sarah Ludington, a law professor at Campbell University, draws attention to the 
surprising phenomenon that “few law professors commented critically-or even uncritically-about 
the government’s domestic policies during the war” of which Japanese-American internment 
represented one of the most controversial. 44 Despite the unmistakable unconstitutionality of the 
program, academics, much like the court, experienced pressures which discouraged them from 
facilitating legal discourse surrounding it. The government employed many academics during the 
war and therefore economically hindered their desire to decry government policy.45 Additionally, 
“academics – like many Americans – may have been willing to turn a blind eye to civil rights 
abuses...in the interests of winning the war.”46 Thus, in the face of economic pressure and 
wartime hysteria, the legal academy was either unmotivated or incapable of defending the rights 
of Japanese Americans. This striking failure is no small issue. Indeed, by failing to criticize the 
policy, academics implicitly conceded that internment had no place in the realm of legal 
discussion. It would be incorrect to claim, however, that no academics spoke out. Ludington 
specifically cites a few cases where professors from law schools such as Yale, Harvard, and 
William and Mary criticized government policy under the protection of their “robust culture of 
academic freedom.”47 It is unfortunate and alarming, though, that these professors were merely 
an exception to an otherwise disturbing rule.   
  
Rightlessness and the Internment Camp  
Internment’s orientation outside of legal jurisdiction placed those within the camps in 
alarming danger with the loss of their juridical person. Juridical personhood “comes into being 
when political authority towards persons is expressed through an institutional order that bears 
attributes of stability such as predictability, intelligibility, and contestability.”48 The very nature 
of the camp was an essential component in depriving Japanese Americans of their juridical 
person. Indeed, Arendt contended that the loss of the juridical person was only completed “by 
 
43 Ibid.  
44 Sarah H. Ludington, “The Dogs that Did Not Bark: The Silence of the Legal Academy During World War II,” 
Journal of Legal Education 60, no. 3 (February 2011): 398.  
45 Ludington, “The Dogs that Did Not Bark,” 404.  
46 Ibid, 413.  
47 Ibid, 430. 
48 Kristen Rundle, “Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons: Developing Public Legal Theory through Fuller and 
Arendt,” Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 3, (2014): 228.  
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placing the concentration camp outside the normal penal system, and by selecting its inmates 
outside the normal judicial procedure.”49 Rights are the essential elements which protect citizens 
in normal judicial proceedings in that they represent the conditions under which political 
authority is expressed. The destruction of the juridical person is thus identical with being without 
rights or, as Hannah Arendt described this condition, “rightlessness.” It is clear that the court’s 
affirmation of the suspension of law which internment entailed licensed the deprival of the most 
basic of constitutional rights.50 According to the Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians, those imprisoned in the camps quickly learned that “Constitutional 
rights were not an individual and personal guarantee if one were an American of Japanese 
ancestry.”51 This claim is more than one of inequality or deprivation. Arendt wrote that the plight 
of the rightless person “is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for 
them.”52 This condition is embodied in the concept of citizenship insofar as it represents, for 
Arendt, the right to have rights.53 This is an exact parallel to the experience of interned Japanese 
Americans. Though the “government never formally stripped Japanese Americans of their 
citizenship...it in effect...nullified their citizenship.”54 Victor Izui, a volunteer from camp in 
Minidoka, Idaho, was keenly aware of this condition as he scoffed at a question about whether he 
felt American. He retorted simply: “how could you feel American? They took away your 
citizenship!”55   
 
49 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 447. Though this essay has refrained from the use of the term 
“concentration camp,” it is important to note that in his dissent in Korematsu v. United States, Justice Roberts 
describes the term “internment camp” as merely a euphemism for concentration camps. Though Justice Black 
admonishes the use of this descriptor with “all the ugly connotations that term implies,” it is clear that these camps 
operated outside of normal judicial procedures and are equally reflective of Arendt’s argument. Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944).  
50 Scholars have contended that the specific rights which the court rendered inapplicable in this case included: 
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of press, right to assemble, freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizures, right to an indictment or to be informed of the charges, right to life, liberty, and property, right to be 
confronted by accusatory witnesses, right to call favorable witnesses, right to legal counsel, right to a speedy and 
public trial, right to reasonable bail, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, right to vote, right to habeas 
corpus, freedom from bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, rights against involuntary servitude, and right to equal 
protection under the laws. The Japanese -American Internment during WWII: A Discussion of Civil Liberties Then 
and Now, LegiSchool Project (Sacramento: Senate Publications, 2000), 30-34; it should also be noted that the 
internment camps were not merely a place of theoretical suffering, indeed, internment camps in Alaska produced 
mortality rates as high as 25% “Forced to Leave: WWII Detention of Alaskan Japanese Americans and Aleuts” in 
University of Alaska Museum, Mary Fenno, ed. Dean Kohlhoff and Terry P. Dickey (Fairbanks: University of 
Alaska Museum, 1997): 5. 
51 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied, 299.  
52 Hannah Arendt, “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man,” in Biopolitics: A Reader, ed. Timothy Campbell and 
Adam Sitze (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 88.  
53 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296.  
54 Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 175.  
55 Victor Izui, interview by Ian Kowata, April 29, 2000, Tape 2, Hanashi Oral History Archives, Go For Broke 




What, then, is the precise meaning of this exile from political existence? Aristotle 
famously wrote that “man is by nature a political animal.”56 Humans, for Aristotle, are animals 
with the capacity to organize themselves politically, and this type of organization is the end 
which separates man from all other animals, with whom he otherwise, on a biological basis, 
shares much in common.57 In the absence of a political community, then, individuals are left in a 
mere biological state. Though the deprival of constitutional rights is egregious in itself, the 
dangers of this state of being bereft of rights and extra-legal orientation produced an even greater 
danger as “the first essential step on the road to total domination is to kill the juridical person in 
man.”58 Arendt argued that that her thesis was at work in Nazi Germany, where Jewish 
individuals were deprived of any legal protection and, in short, “a condition of complete 
rightlessness was created before the right to live was challenged.”59 Interned Japanese Americans 
were reduced to a life unqualified by the ability to possess legal or political rights and thus 
placed in alarming danger.   
It would seem that this return to life stripped of its political qualification is the precise 
case in which one may claim the protections of human rights, yet this was not possible. Again, 
Arendt’s work offers a useful tool of analysis and forecloses the possibility of seeking protection 
in anything but a political community. She wrote that in the absence of rights accorded by 
citizenship, people attempt to lay claim to their inborn rights, yet these rights are in natural 
opposition to civilization and are thus immediately suspect.60 While these inborn rights are based 
on unchanging principles of humanity, civilization is based on the principle of equality which is 
necessarily not inherent. Indeed, “we are not born equal; we become equal as members of a 
group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights.”61 Izui 
confronted this reality as he realized that “[the Constitution] didn’t mean anything. It was just a 
piece of paper.”62 Izui recognized that the Constitution carried little force for Japanese 
Americans who had been expelled as subjects of this document. Though the Constitution and the 
rights which it establishes were intended by the framers to represent “certain unalienable Rights,” 
as described by the Declaration of Independence, these supposedly inborn rights immediately 
lost force with the exile of Japanese Americans from the community which would guarantee 
them.63 Indeed, in her analysis of the development of human rights, Arendt wrote that “the 
moment human beings lacked their own government...no authority was left to protect them and 
no institution was willing to guarantee them.”64 The term “inborn rights,” is, therefore, an 
 
56 Aristotle, Politics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The 
Modern Library, 2001), 1129.  
57 Giorgio Agamben, “Introduction to Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life,” in Biopolitics: A Reader, ed. 
Timothy Campbell and Adam Sitze (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 135.  
58 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 447.  
59 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296.  
60 Ibid, 301.  
61 Ibid, 301.  
62 Izui, interview.  
63 Thomas Jefferson, "The Declaration of Independence," Historic American Documents (1776), accessed December 
13, 2019, https://etc.usf.edu/lit2go/133/historic-americandocuments/4957/the-declaration-of-independence/.  
64 Arendt, “The Perplexities of the Rights of Man,” 82.  
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oxymoron. Furthermore, claiming these rights gives rise to another unique danger. Arendt argues 
that this opposition between the claim to natural rights and equality through organization remind 
states “of the limitations of human activity.”65  
For this reason, Arendt claims, “highly developed political communities, such as the 
ancient city-states or modern nation-states, so often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they 
hope to eliminate as far as possible those natural and always present differences and 
differentiation” which represent the areas which man cannot change and which they tend to 
destroy in forms such as ethnic cleansing.66 The interned were thus confronted with the necessity 
of regaining their place in the American community in the absence of their juridical person.  
The internment diary of Hatsuye Egami offers a material illustration of this abstract claim 
in representing the human experience of a life deprived of its juridical person. Egami was born in 
Tokyo in 1902 and immigrated to the United States in 1921.67 Besides this and limited 
information about Egami’s family, little is known about her life.68 Her diary begins on May 12, 
1942, immediately before she is to be relocated to the Tulare Assembly Center. As she reflects 
on the whirlwind of relocation, she laments that “since yesterday, we Pasadena Japanese have 
ceased to be human beings – we are now simply numbers or things. We are no longer ‘Egamis’ 
but the number 23324.”69 The Egamis thus immediately recognize that the loss of their rights is 
tantamount to a lack of humanity itself. It is this feeling which Arendt explains as she considers 
human rights. Paradoxically, though these inborn rights are meant to apply precisely in the case 
where a person lacks a political community willing to ensure legal rights and therefore has 
nothing to claim but his or her humanity, “the opposite is the case…a man who is nothing but a 
man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellow-
man.”70 Egami continues her reflection in describing her hope for the future despite her 
realization of their expulsion from the body politic. She wrote: “it may be that in a naked life 
there is poetry and truth. I think that from this bare life we can weave something creative and 
interesting. The person that can do that is one who is really intelligent and wise.”71   
Egami’s words prove prophetic as it is precisely through the body itself that Japanese 
Americans crafted lives of dignity and resistance in the face of such ominous conditions. The 
nullification of citizenship for Japanese Americans which placed them in such alarming danger 
also posed a challenge to their resistance. They had not lost their rights, but the right to possess 
them in the first place. Thus, challenges based on a claim of rights could only fail. Their natural 
life without political qualification also possessed no rights in itself. Their only hope, then, was to 
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regain that right which precluded them from the others, their membership in the American 
political community, through the sacrifice of the bare corpus.  
  
Volunteering as a Political Act  
Though some volunteers chose to sacrifice their lives, others refused to serve on the basis 
of the violation of their rights. The position of the JACL at the time was that Japanese Americans 
should join the U.S. army in order to prove their loyalty.72 The League went so far as to suggest a 
suicide battalion of Japanese American soldiers who would be sent to die in impossible 
missions.73 There were, however, a considerable number of internees who refused to serve on the 
grounds that they had been denied their constitutional rights. These “no-no boys” claimed that 
they could not be expected to perform their obligations as citizens when their citizenship had 
been nullified.74 For them, it was “absurd to ask any interned individual to defend American 
democracy from behind barbed wire.”75 A great deal of conflict erupted between these groups 
within the camps. Robert Ichikawa, a volunteer from the Amache, Colorado, internment camp 
recalled: “all the no-no boys, you know they called us all kinds of names, they called us dogs, 
inu.”76   
In some cases, the tension between the two groups was so extreme that it resulted in 
violence. Those Japanese Americans educated in Japan were commonly referred to as “kibei” 
and were generally opposed to volunteering to serve. Masaru Ishida, another volunteer from 
Topaz, Utah, recalled: “We had some kibeis, well they were mean you know?”77 He goes on to 
tell a story about his friend saying: “He nearly got killed because, you know, he said ‘volunteer, 
volunteer!’”78 This was not an isolated event in Topaz. Ishida recalled that he had to help another 
friend run away because “they were gonna kill him too because he was pro-serving the 
country.”79 This opposition ran so deeply that it often affected the families of volunteers as well. 
Izui learned after the war that once he had left for training, some parents of the no-no boys “came 
 
72 Arthur A. Hansen, “The 1944 Nisei Draft at Heart Mountain, Wyoming: Its Relationship to the Historical 
Representation of the World War II Japanese American Evacuation,” OAH Magazine of History 10, no. 4 (Summer, 
1996): 52. 
73 Paul R. Spickard, “The Nisei Assume Power: The Japanese Citizens League 1941-1942,” Pacific Historical 
Review 52, no. 2 (May 1983): 164.  
74 Holly Allen, “The Citizen-Soldier and the Citizen-Internee: Fraternity, Race, and American Nationhood, 1942-
46,” in Forgotten Men and Fallen Women: The Cultural Politics of New Deal Narratives (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2015), 184.  
75 Allen, “The Citizen-Soldier and the Citizen-Internee,” 187.  
76 Robert Ichikawa, interview by Russell Nakaishi, February 25, 2001, Tape 2, Hanashi Oral History Archives, 
Go For Broke National Education Center, Los Angeles, CA, 
http://www.goforbroke.org/learn/archives/oral_histories_videos.php?clip=15502.  
77 Masaru Ishida, interview by Robert Horsting, June 29, 2002, Tape 2, Masaru Ishida Oral History Interview, 
Japanese American History Collective, Chicago, IL, 
http://www.goforbroke.org/learn/archives/oral_histories_videos.php?clip=29102. 
78 Ishida, interview.  
79 Ibid.  
39 
 
to [his] mother and gave her a real bad time.”80 The resentment flowed both ways. Kaihara, 
remembers that “at first I resented [no-no boys] being that way, but after giving it a great deal of 
thought…I might have done the same thing.”81 Kaihara’s newfound sympathy is shared by 
revisionist historians who have come to define each action as “complementary species of 
praiseworthy Americanism” in order to combat the no-no boys’ widespread ostracism from not 
only American society but also from that of the Japanese-American community.82 Despite this 
claim of respect for each position, there remains an opposition between these two responses 
insofar as scholars often hold that though those who refused to serve made a political statement 
of resistance, those who volunteered were apolitical and concerned only with patriotic duty.    
Some scholars have gone so far as to label the apparent pure patriotism of volunteers 
from internment camps as a “‘blind obedience’ response to injustice.” 83 At the surface level, the 
oral histories of once interned veterans seem to support this claim. Ishida remembers his mother 
telling him to serve in a simple imperative: “You gotta be patriotic.”84 Similarly, though Izui did 
not feel initially inclined to volunteer, it was his mother who convinced him to join. Izui 
remembers that “she urged loyalty, unstinting loyalty to my country, even if she was wrong in 
interning us.”85 This sentiment was echoed by Jimmy Konno who said as he described his 
reasons for serving rather than resisting: “If you’re gonna live in this country, you gotta do 
something, and if you wanna resist I won’t go against ya, that’s your decision.”86   
Further examination reveals, however, that the loyalty of these volunteers was far from 
blind. Stanley Hayami, a volunteer from the Heart Mountain internment camp, wrote: “Do I 
think it was constitutional? No, I do not. We did not go through due process of law…Do I think 
racial prejudice was involved? Yes.”87 Izui recalled feeling betrayed by the promises of the 
American experiment saying: “all that stuff that they taught us in school, what the heck does that 
mean? What a sham.”88 Yasunori Deguchi, a volunteer from Hawaii, expressed a similar 
sentiment when he learned about internment from the mainland volunteers. He was astounded 
that “the country we were supposed to have gotten the right information from school 
days…turned out to be this.”89 Far from being blindly obedient, Japanese-American volunteers 
 
80 Izui, interview.  
81 Thomas Kaihara, interview by Richard Hawkins, June 27, 2002, Tape 3, Hanashi Oral History Archives, Go For 
Broke National Education Center, Chicago, IL, 
http://www.goforbroke.org/learn/archives/oral_histories_videos.php?clip=28603.  
82 Hansen, “The 1944 Nisei Draft at Heart Mountain, Wyoming,” 52.   
83 Chris K. Iijima, “Reparations and the ‘Model Minority’ Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the 
Return to Original Humiliation,” Boston College Third World Law Journal 19, no.1 (Dec. 1998): 399.  
84 Ishida, interview.  
85 Izui, interview. 
86 Jimmy Konno, interview by Robery Horsting, May 3, 2003, Tape 2, Hanashi Oral History Archives, Go For 
Broke National Education Center, New York City, NY, 
http://www.goforbroke.org/learn/archives/oral_histories_videos.php?clip=34502.  
87 Stanley Hayami, 26 June 1943, Stanley Hayami Diary 1941-1944, Online Archive of California.  
88 Izui, interview. 
89 Yasunori Deguchi, interview by Russel Nakaishi, March 17, 2006, Tape 2, Hanashi Oral History Archives, Go 




had a deep understanding of the wrongs they had endured. Conrad Kurahara summarizes this 
feeling well saying: “deep down we knew what a terrible wrong it was.”90 How can one then 
reconcile their ultimate decision to serve in an apparently patriotic fashion with this critical 
political consciousness?  
The interviews and diaries of volunteers from camp reveal a common awareness and fear 
of being without a state. This crisis motivated many to volunteer in order to claim their place in 
the American political community and was thus consistent with their political consciousness as it 
was their only viable means of protection. Though many initially responded to the draft like 
Mitsuo Kodama who recalls: “I was so mad, I said: ‘to Hell with the United States Army, I 
wouldn’t join you guys for nothin’” or Victor Izui who said simply and emphatically, “Up your 
ass, Uncle Sam!” they eventually volunteered to avert the dangers of being without a state.91 
Indeed, Kodama decided to serve when confronted by his mother who told him:  
You were born and raised in the United States, you only have one country and that 
country is America, the United States. If you went to Japan you would not be accepted as 
a Japanese you are a ‘Gaijin,’ which is a foreigner, so, therefore, you will be treated like a 
foreigner and you will not be accepted as a Japanese and your life will be miserable in 
Japan.92   
Kodama’s initial hope to become part of the Japanese political community implicitly confirms 
the necessity of joining one of these communities in order to regain one’s ability to possess 
rights. As other social factors would prevent his inclusion in Japan, his only option was to 
reclaim his American citizenship by serving in the military. Hayami expresses this same concern 
and realizes that it is imperative to lay claim to citizenship and the rights it entails. As he 
contemplated volunteering, he wrote: “now the people outside want to take our citizenship 
away...if they take our citizenship away from us we’ll be people without a country!”93 Though 
Hayami did not, perhaps, realize that he already occupied a position in which his citizenship was 
nullified, the fear he feels at the thought of being without a country indicates that these 
volunteers were aware of the dangers they faced in the absence of one. Lloyd Kurihara, a 
volunteer from the Poston, Arizona internment camp also echoed this same sentiment saying 
simply: “I had no other place to go.”94 Though seemingly non-political, this statement also 
carries the urgency of membership in a community.  These volunteers, should they desire to 
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ensure their safety and that of their community, had to make a claim to political inclusion, yet it 
was their very exclusion which foreclosed the possibility of doing so through rights claims. 
Having been reduced to a body lacking political significance, it was only through the physical 
body that a viable challenge to their political alienation was possible.   
This fear of statelessness and the urgency of regaining of political community could only 
be achieved by the sacrifice of the pure, biological body. These volunteers often indicate that 
they did not think in terms of rights questions at the time of their internment. When asked if he 
thought in terms of constitutional rights, Thomas Kaihara, whose father was interned at Tule 
Lake, replied: “not at that time.”95 Similarly, Izui’s mother convinced him to serve and “kept 
stressing…duty more than rights.”96 Simply because they did not think in terms of rights, though, 
did not mean that their actions were apolitical. Indeed, having established that the extra-legal 
nature of internment entailed the inability to lay claim to rights in the first place, claiming rights 
as a form of resistance would be futile and ineffective. In the absence of legal rights and the 
ability to challenge for them, the only way to lay claim to the political community which could 
then grant them these rights was by risking and sacrificing their lives on the battlefield. Kaihara 
said: “if I got killed in combat, at least my brother can say: ‘look, my brother gave his life for his 
country.’ They can walk up the street with their heads high.”97 This is not merely a claim of pride 
for Kaihara’s brother, but rather indicates that the sacrifice of his life would gain his family 
inclusion in the  
American political community as they could once again walk its streets with dignity. The 
actions of these volunteers, then, represented a thoroughly political statement in that it 
represented the re-integration of human biological existence into a community.  
  
Conclusion  
The Japanese Americans who fought for the United States went on to become the most 
decorated troops of the war in the 442nd and the 100th infantry battalion.98 Through their bravery, 
they earned their inclusion in the American body politic. This achievement was most famously 
recognized by President Truman who remarked “you fought not only the enemy, but you fought 
prejudice – and you have won.”99 This story of success, however, has often been used to support 
a myth which holds that Asian Americans “did not make waves, overcame prejudice, and turned 
into good solid middle-class citizens.”100 The story of Japanese-American volunteers has become 
a paradigmatic case which has been mobilized to argue that success is possible even in the most 
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oppressive conditions when people are not so concerned with political claims and work harder to 
overcome them. A 1949 article about the post-war race relations of Japanese American and white 
soldiers hints at this argument. To the author, interaction between these soldiers at a football 
game demonstrated that “if you don’t run around squalling about minorities and their rights, but 
simply take action...very few people...will give it a second thought.”101 The language of this text 
illustrates a somewhat demeaning tone with regard to those Japanese Americans who refused to 
fight because of the nullification of their rights and, more broadly, to those who attempt to create 
social change for disadvantaged groups. To proponents of this myth, “Asian Americans vindicate 
the American Dream.”102 This myth is thus used to maintain the status quo, for those who believe 
in it may indicate that the disadvantages which other minorities face are simply a result of their 
poor effort. The blame for their conditions is thus shifted away from American society and 
placed squarely on the shoulders of those who it disadvantages. Examining Japanese-American 
volunteers, then, reveals that their success was not because of a lack of focus on the political or a 
willing investment in the society which had deprived them. The underpinnings of myths of Asian 
success are called into question. Those who volunteered were not blindly obedient, unaware, or 
unwilling to challenge for rights; they understood that they lacked the ability to make such 
claims in exile from their political community in their given historical context. Perhaps one of 
the most common phrases used by Japanese Americans during internment gains another meaning 
in this context. “Shikata Ga Nai” is a Japanese phrase meaning: “it cannot be helped.” Those that 
used this phrase did not mean their situation was helpless, but perhaps that they had little 
recourse other than to do whatever was necessary to rejoin the American community. The 
dangers they faced without this community were such that their ultimate sacrifice to regain their 
place within it truly could not be helped. One is then left to contemplate how it is that such a 
sacrifice was necessary and realize that this was not triumph, but tragedy.   
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